No. 135: LOS VALORES DEL PAISAJE Ponencias del Seminario del Paisaje (2008) que abordan con distintos puntos de vista los valores del paisaje, buscando entender mejor los significados del paisaje en el horizonte de la modernidad, las cualidades que se le atribuyen y el sentido que de esa manera adquiere.

El gran zoo (1984), del poeta cubano Nicolás Guillén, ofrece distintas representaciones sobre el Caribe. El artículo argumenta que el texto de Nicolás Guillén se inscribe dentro del movimiento literario hispanoamericano de la neovanguardia. Luego, se examinan algunas características formales del texto, tomando como ejemplo los poemas “El sueño” y “Guitarra”. Otro poema que se estudia con más detenimiento es “El tenor”, el cual parodia la división entre la alta cultura y la cultura popular. Por último, se analizan (...) varias alusiones del poemario al contexto histórico de la Guerra Fría y la Carrera Espacial. (shrink)

En el presente escrito se considera una interrogante planteada por Heidegger en la pregunta por la técnica (Die Frage nach der Technik), vale decir, la pregunta por una determinación esencial de la técnica, en relación con los planteamientos orteguianos sobre ella. Específicamente, intentaremos abordar una cuestión que Acevedo (1997) insinúa en su introducción a la pregunta por la técnica, vale decir, si es que acaso las reflexiones de Ortega sobre la técnica —especialmente por su marcada consideración en relación con (...) la vida humana como proyecto— se quedan en el plano de una mera determinación correcta —como relación medio-fin antropológica— o bien podrían eventualmente trascender dicho esquema en favor de un tratamiento fenomenológico que vincula la técnica con lo más hondo de la existencia del hombre. (shrink)

El propósito del presente artículo es investigar cuál es la relación del pensamiento con la vida humana entendida como proyecto vital en la filosofía de Ortega. Con este ejercicio argumental se busca, por un lado, una adecuada delimitación de lo que significa el pensamiento y, por el otro, establecer de manera precisa que el asunto del pensamiento es un elemento de valor sistemático que va unido a la cuestión del valor problemático que presenta la vida humana en las reflexiones (...) orteguianas. Esto se vería reflejado en las posibles conexiones que se pueden establecer entre “Apuntes sobre el pensamiento: su teúrgia y su demiurgia” y el resto del corpus orteguiano. De este modo, nos haremos cargo de la cuestión del rol del pensamiento en el planteamiento filosófico de Ortega. (shrink)

El libro contiene doce lecciones dadas por el autor en la Universidad Central de Madrid en 1933. Ortega desarrolla el planteamiento de los problemas generales de la historia y de la "historiología". Analiza los acontecimientos que causaron el inicio y evolución del pensamiento moderno. La vida de Galileo, en su opinión, marca el inicio del imperio de la razón pura, que comienza con la "rebelión de las ciencias" frente al dominio precedente de la teología. Se hace un estudio del (...) cristianismo como forma de vida, su aparición, justificación histórica y desarrollo, hasta convertirse en el elemento central de la cultura occidental. El autor analiza el cristianismo al margen de la fe y de cualquier dimensión sobrenatural, lo que le lleva a tratar la religión como una más entre las teorías filosóficas existentes. Ortega considera equivocadamente que la base del cristianismo es el reconocimiento de la nulidad del hombre y de la naturaleza. La verdadera línea de desarrollo de la filosofía cristiana --marcada, según él, por Duns Scoto, Eckhart y Nicolás Cusano--, desemboca necesariamente en una completa ruptura entre la fe y la razón. La doctrina de Santo Tomás habría supuesto, en cambio, una deformación del cristianismo, un intento de "racionalizar la fe" mediante la introducción del aristotelismo en el estudio de la teología. (shrink)

Tras la conquista castellana de Córdoba, en 1236, la nueva parroquia de San Nicolás de la Ajerquía aprovechó como iglesia una pequeña mezquita junto al río Guadalquivir. El edificio, ampliado a mitad del siglo XVI y reiteradamente transformado a lo largo del tiempo, mantuvo la preexistencia islámica hasta las importantes reformas del período 1725-27, que supusieron su total demolición. Pese a que existen varias alusiones documentales de aquellos años y un dibujo a mano alzada de la planta conservado en (...) el archivo parroquial, esta mezquita ha pasado prácticamente inadvertida en la historiografía especializada, quizás porque los escasos y ambiguos datos conocidos no permiten estimar su arquitectura. En este trabajo se analiza directamente el dibujo original, contextualizándolo con distintos planos y documentos históricos. Esto ha permitido formular una hipótesis sobre las dimensiones de la sala de oración de la mezquita, su orientación aproximada, así como sobre su conformación arquitectónica interior: una planta prácticamente cuadrada, organizada en nueve ámbitos con cierta autonomía espacial y cubiertos con bóvedas. Seguiría en esto a un tipo de mezquita hace tiempo detectada por Creswell, que la denominó «nine-dome-mosque», y de la que sería el único ejemplo conocido en Córdoba. (shrink)

Love enhancement can give us as a say on whom we love and thus ‘free’ us from our brain chemistry, which is mostly out of our control. In that way, we become more autonomous in love and in our life in general, as long as love enhancement is a free, voluntary choice. So goes the argument in favour of this addition to medical interventions of relationships. In this paper, I show that proponents of love enhancement have overlooked, or at least (...) underestimated, the fact that love itself impacts people’s choices. Since this could include the choice for love or anti-love drugs, I call for a re-formulation of the underlying view on autonomy before this medical intervention is made available to the public. (shrink)

The widely accepted “continuing bonds” model of grief tells us that rather than bereavement necessitating the cessation of one’s relationship with the deceased, very often the relationship continues instead in an adapted form. However, this framework appears to conflict with philosophical approaches that treat reciprocity or mutuality of some form as central to loving relationships. Seemingly the dead cannot be active participants, rendering it puzzling how we should understand claims about continued relationships with them. In this article, we resolve this (...) tension by highlighting two fundamental aspects of paradigmatic loving relationships that can, and often do, continue in an adapted form following bereavement: love and mutual shaping of interests, choices, and self-concepts. Attention to these continuing features of relationships helps to capture and clarify the phenomenological and behavioral features of continuing bonds. However, love and mutual shaping must also change in important ways following bereavement. Love becomes unreciprocated, and although the dead continue to shape our interests, choices, and self-concepts, we predominantly shape their legacies and memories in return. These changes place important constraints upon the nature of our interpersonal connections with the dead. (shrink)

Los textos que se presentan a continuación aúnan a reconocidos estudiosos en el cartesianismo, junto a investigadores más nóveles. Son fruto además de un proyecto de investigación financiado por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, [Referencia PID2021-126133NB-100] que lleva por título: Éticas y metafísica de los afectos. Las génesis modernas del presente actual (EMAP). Se ofrecen, por tanto, los estudios que siguen como resultados de este proyecto, que inició su andadura en septiembre de 2022.

Most philosophers would agree that loving one’s romantic partner (i.e., being in love) is, in principle, a good thing. That is, romantic love can be valuable. It seems plausible that most would then think that the process leading to being in love—i.e. falling in love—can be valuable too. Surprisingly, that is not the case: among philosophers, falling in love has a bad reputation. Whereas philosophy of love has started to depart from traditional (and often unwarranted or false) tropes surrounding romantic (...) life, this tendency has not yet reached the analysis of falling in love. The phenomenon continues to be looked at mostly through a compendium of generalisations taken as metaphysical truths—the view of falling in love being akin to “losing one’s mind” or “not being able to think about anything else”. Here, I analyse some of these generalisations to show that although they may reflect some experiences of what falling in love feels like, they wrongly reduce falling in love to two related, but distinct, phenomena: limerence and infatuation. My aim is to refine the current terminology to lay the foundations for a neutral view of falling in love. (shrink)

In this paper we develop a view about the disorientation attached to the process of falling out of love and explain its prudential and moral value. We start with a brief background on theories of love and situate our argument within the views concerned with the lovers’ identities. Namely, love changes who we are. In the context of our paper, we explain this common tenet in the philosophy of love as a change in the lovers’ self-concepts through a process of (...) mutual shaping. This, however, is potentially dangerous for people involved in what we call ‘subsuming relationships’, who give up too much autonomy in the process of mutual shaping. We then move on to show how, through the relation between love and the self-concept, we can explain why the process of falling out of love with someone is so disorientating: when one is falling out of love, one loses an important point of reference for self-understanding. While this disorientating process is typically taken to be harmful to the person experiencing it, we will explain how it can also have moral and prudential value. By re-evaluating who we were in the relationship and who we are now, we can escape from oppressive practices in subsuming relationships. We finish by arguing that this gives us reason to be wary of seeking to re-orient ourselves -or others- too quickly after falling out of love. (shrink)

People who experience love often experience break-ups as well. However, philosophers of love have paid little attention to the phenomenon. Here, I address that gap by looking at the grieving process which follows unchosen relationship terminations. I ask which one is the loss that, if it were to be recovered, would stop grief or make it unwarranted. Is it the beloved, the reciprocation of love, the relationship, or all of it? By answering this question I not only provide with an (...) insight on the nature of break-ups, but also make a specific claim about the nature of love. I argue that the object that is universally lost in all break-ups is a person with certain intrinsic qualities, who is in a relationship characterised by certain shared activities and recognized as romantic. That means that, at least in romantic terminations, the beloved and the relationship are not independent objects of grief. So, plausibly, they may not independent objects of value in love. Hence, those who state otherwise should face up to this objection coming from the study of break-ups. (shrink)

El artículo aborda el envejecimiento poblacional y la eutanasia desde una perspectiva ética basada en los principios de la bioética personalista ontológicamente fundamentada. Se resaltan los principios de la dignidad de la persona, el respeto a la vida física, la solidaridad, la subsidiariedad, la justicia y el bien común y se muestra cómo se aplican en ambos contextos. Se enfatiza la importancia de un diálogo honesto sobre la eutanasia, evitando la manipulación del lenguaje. Se destaca que cualquier discusión sobre la (...) eutanasia debe ser respaldada por una reflexión ética profunda y que los derechos de las personas mayores deben protegerse en todo momento. El artículo aborda estas cuestiones complejas desde una perspectiva que valore la dignidad y los derechos de las personas mayores y promueva su bienestar, al tiempo que se discuten de manera reflexiva y responsable las cuestiones éticas en torno a la eutanasia. (shrink)

Descartes consolida el paso de la ciencia de la verdad a la ciencia del hombre. En esta prima un cura sui, que acabará fortaleciendo al sujeto interiormente y desenfocando al otro. Todo hombre podría ser sabio; si bien, no desde la experiencia de la conciencia como ejercicio metódico y teórico del alma; pero sí como forma de vida que educa el fortalecimiento de la voluntad. La generosidad será la forma de la virtud, y si bien esta incluye las formas del (...) amor, el cogito cartesiano no logra salir de la auto-referencialidad. (shrink)

Los artículos de este segundo número monográfico dedicado a Descartes son un fruto más del proyecto de investigación -financiado por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, [Referencia PID2021-126133NB-I00]- que lleva por título: Éticas y metafísica de los afectos. Las génesis modernas del presente actual (EMAP). Se ofrecen a continuación relecturas cartesianas que ponen el acento en la revisión de ciertos tópicos atribuidos al pensamiento del padre de la modernidad, más mencionado que leído y estudiado.

Este artículo analiza jurídica y éticamente el derecho a la lactancia en la maternidad subrogada, abordando sus complejidades desde una perspectiva integral. Se destaca la necesidad de regular la maternidad subrogada a nivel federal en México, protegiendo los derechos del menor y su derecho a la lactancia materna. Se promueve una crianza afectiva y la creación de nuevas normas biojurídicas considerando la jurisdicción y los requisitos de los padres. La promoción de la lactancia materna en la maternidad subrogada se basa (...) en el beneficio ético del menor. Se resalta la importancia de una atención integral durante el puerperio y la lactancia, valorando la salud mental y garantizando una lactancia adecuada. Se recomienda cláusulas en los contratos de subrogación para extender su duración y asegurar la lactancia y el desarrollo saludable del menor. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la secuencia de argumentos expuestos por Arendt en la segundaparte de La vida del espíritu orientados a dar cuenta de que la voluntad es la facultadespiritual creadora de la persona susceptible de ser considerada responsable de susactos y de su ser. En primer término, se examinan las ideas arendtianas acerca de lascomplejidades de la voluntad como una facultad atravesada por paradojas y controversias.Luego se explicitan los vínculos descubiertos por Arendt entre la voluntad yla responsabilidad. Finalmente, se indaga (...) sobre el concepto de natalidad como alternativade asunción de la paradojal responsabilidad. (shrink)

Empezamos mostrando el papel primordial del teatro en la filosofía de Gabriel Marcel. La necesidad que tiene su pensamiento de partir de situaciones concretas le lleva a convertirse en un autor dramático. En segundo lugar y partiendo de la trama de la obra Le palais de sable y de la evolución de sus personajes, analizaremos las implicaciones destructivas que provoca una falsa fe basada en una cierta concepción idealista de ella. Por último situaremos nuestra mirada en la conciencia creyente para (...) poder acceder al análisis existencial de la fe. (shrink)

The current predominant conception of human rights implies that human beings have objective intrinsic value. In this paper, we defend that there is no satisfactory justification of this claim. In spite of the great variety of theories aimed at explaining objective intrinsic value, all of them share one common problematic feature: they pass from a non-evaluative proposition to an evaluative proposition by asserting that a certain entity has intrinsic value in virtue of having certain non-evaluative features. This is a step (...) that cannot be justified. In light of this negative result, we offer a radically different approach to intrinsic value. Our proposal reinterprets the claim that human beings have intrinsic value in terms of a commitment to value human beings intrinsically. This commitment provides both objective practical reasons for, and a rational explanation of, efforts aimed at defending and promoting human rights, without need to appeal to the existence of objective intrinsic value. (shrink)

The idea that love changes who we are is widely shared, and has been mostly explored from a stance in the middle stage of love (i.e., when people already love each other). But how do we get there? And what happens when love ends? In this chapter, I explore how self-understanding may be shaped in different ways at different stages of love through the notions of narrative and existential feeling. As I will argue, love gains narrative momentum at the beginning, (...) which is maintained during the middle, and ultimately extinguished at the end. This momentum is triggered and later sustained by the existential feeling that ‘things make sense’, which keeps the lovers oriented towards each other. (shrink)

The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic (...) and independent of belief rejection. Independent research supports the existence of a system of fragmented belief storage: one that relies on large numbers of causally isolated, context-sensitive stores of belief in memory. Finally, empirical and observational data support at least two systems of belief change. One system adheres, mostly, to epistemological norms of updating; the other, the psychological immune system, functions to guard our most centrally held beliefs from potential inconsistency with newly formed beliefs. Refining our under- standing of these systems can shed light on pressing real-world issues, such as how fake news, propaganda, and brainwashing exploit our psychology of belief, and how best to construct our modern informational world. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se pretende poner en relación la noción de kénosis, sobre la que se configura esencialmente la concepción hermenéutica de la religión en Gianni Vattimo, con la pretensión emancipatoria que surge del nihilismo hermenéutico. Para ello rastrearemos esa concepción hermenéutica de la verdad que ya no nos violenta, a partir de la cual se estructura la religión del pensamiento débil. Además, constataremos cómo la concepción hermenéutica de la metafísica, aparte de presentarse como clave de la secularización, permitirá (...) identificar la salvación con la interpretación. Sobre estos presupuestos generales de su filosofía Vattimo anuncia la venida de Jesús como fenómeno hermenéutico. Tendremos que preguntarnos finalmente si las posibilidades de este planteamiento trágico de la kénosis se llevan hasta sus últimas consecuencias con el anuncio sociopolítico de una emancipación de corte hermenéutico. (shrink)

Este libro sintetiza el pensamiento de un intelectual del siglo XX que ha tomado el pulso a su epoca. Su concepcion de Espana, la revision de los mitos en los que hemos sido educados, su raciovitalismo, su teoria del amor o sus meditaciones una valiosa aproximacion a un tiempo, el nuestro, que no es sino nuestro destino.

When travelling to a new city, we acquire knowledge about its physical terrain, directions, historical facts and aesthetic features. Engaging in tourism practices, such as guided walking tours, provides experiences of a city that are necessarily mediated and partial. This has led scholars in tourism studies, and more recently in philosophy, to question the epistemological value of city tours, critiquingthem as passive, lacking in autonomous agency, and providing misrepresentative experiences of the city. In response, we argue that the mediated and (...) partial knowledge of a city acquired through city tours is not epistemologically disvaluable. Although city tours involve the transmission of testimonial knowledge, this does not necessarily render tourists as passive and non-autonomous. Instead,tourists have the potential to participate in the generation of their knowledge actively. Moreover, we argue that city tours also provide a tourist with valuable ‘objectual’ knowledge of a city, whichhas the potential to be first-personal and active, and does not necessarily misrepresent the city’s identity. This type of knowledge is valuable both for tourists as credible epistemic agents, and for the city itself, as the knowledge generated by the tour can facilitate an accurate representation of the city and promote social transformation. We conclude by highlighting four further epistemic and ethical implications of our argument. (shrink)

En este artículo, Moya analiza el affaire Wikileaks, a la luz de la tesis que Pekka Himanen propone en el libro La ética hacker y el espíritu de la era de la información: los hackers, y sus valores de apertura, cooperación y creatividad, son los verdaderos arquitectos de la nueva sociedad digital.

En este capítulo, defiendo que el proceso de identificación presente en relaciones de amor romántico tiene una estructura narrativa en tres niveles: social, intersubjetivo y personal.

A common approach in the philosophy of love defines love as caring about one another and promoting one another's interests, aims and values. The view faces several problems and has been re-formulated to avoid them. However, here I argue that a larger re-formulation of the definition of love is needed in order to accommodate three instances of what I call 'non-harmonious' relationships. I identify three types of non-harmonious love (featuring problematic interests, opposing interests and neutral interests the lovers do not (...) care about) and ultimately claim that our definition of love must incorporate conflict and self- interest, and we should then abandon the excessive focus on the sharing of values. (shrink)

We aim to do two things in this article. On the positive end, our goal is to explain how some seemingly incompatible aspects of belief live together, by presenting distinct mechanistic explanations of each of them: in particular we want to show how belief can be discerning, credulous, rational, and irrational. After clarifying our positive view, we take aim at some competitor views in the second half of the paper, particularly offering critiques of epistemic vigilance and social marketplace accounts of (...) belief. We conclude by inviting proponents to provide an architecture for belief that can be tested against existing models. (shrink)

Can our relationship with nature be loving and reciprocal? The claim is hard to sustain when nature is taken to encompass polluted and urban places. The notion of reciprocity loses its force, and the lovability of these places is put into question. Also, the demand of love may obscure the ethical demand in our relationship with nature: to be responsible in our meaning-making practices.

What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate question or as an ultimate question. The question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful (...) articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants' distributions aim at sharing the costs and benefits of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is influenced by effort and talent, and the perception of each participant's rights on the resources to be distributed. (shrink)

In their strife for designing a moral system where everyone is given equal consideration, cosmopolitan theorists have merely tolerated partiality as a necessary evil (insofar it means that we give priority to our kin opposite the distant needy). As a result, the cosmopolitan ideal has long departed from our moral psychologies and our social realities. Here I put forward partial cosmopolitanism as an alternative to save that obstacle. Instead of demanding impartial universal action, it requires from us that we are (...) equally responsive in all the relationships we stand in. That goes from the local to the cosmopolitan sphere, since I defend that we are related with strangers as co-members of the global community. Thus, partiality not only is accommodated by cosmopolitanism, but actually supports it: only by having meaningful personal relationships we become able to care for distant strangers. (shrink)

This article defends a relational account of personhood. I argue that the structure of personhood consists of dyadic relations between persons who can wrong or be wronged by one another, even if some of them lack moral competence. I draw on recent work on directed duties to outline the structure of moral communities of persons. The upshot is that we can construct an inclusive theory of personhood that can accommodate nonhuman persons based on shared community membership. I argue that, once (...) we unpack the internal relation between directed duties, moral status, and flourishing, relations can ground personhood and include nonhuman animals. (shrink)